The war in Ukraine is in constant flux, evolving from a blitzkrieg at the beginning of the armed conflict to trench warfare and war of attrition, and now involving shock troop tactics and artillery duels. A significant factor driving these changes in warfare is the evolving technology being used within the conflict.
There are several technological developments in the Ukraine war that, with their deployment, are more or less altering the face of the conflict. Whether it’s the use of highly precise cruise missiles like the Storm Shadow or Kinzhal, high-precision artillery rocket systems like HIMARS, guided glide bombs, or, as recently announced, the short-range ballistic missile system ATACMS.
In addition to the increased use of those conventional state-of-the-art precision weapons by both sides, the development of drone warfare has been the most rapid.
At the onset of the Russian invasion, Turkish Bayraktar drones garnered attention with successful attacks on Russian convoys. However, these classic Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) are no longer visible in the skies. The air defense network on the frontlines has become too dense for such large drones to survive. A shift in strategy was necessary. Instead of large UAVs, including UCAVs, smaller and more disposable models are increasingly used for reconnaissance as well as direct attacks. These drones are much harder to identify and intercept due to their small size and low flying altitude. The Ukrainian Armed Forces recognized this early on and began using short-range small drones to drop grenades into the positions of Russian soldiers. This concept wasn’t entirely new, as ISIS had employed a similar idea in the wars in Syria and Iraq. What’s new is the implementation on an operational and tactical level and the associated proliferation of small combat and reconnaissance drones. Originally born out of necessity due to a lack of an effective air force and other precision weapons, the Ukrainian Armed Forces‘ approach in the game of drones has proven successful.
The Russian side on the other hand began using long-range kamikaze drones of Iranian origin (also known as Loitering Ammunition) to target strategic objectives across Ukraine in the fall of last year. As a substitute for expensive and less available cruise missiles, these drones also proved successful. Even today, the optimized Russian Geran-2 drones of the same type continue to attack infrastructure and weapon depots in Ukraine, deep behind the line of contact. The advantage of these drones, like the smaller ones, lies in their size and affordability. In response, Ukraine escalated its drone capabilities this summer, regularly sending almost weekly waves of similar long-range kamikaze drones towards Moscow.
In the area of drone defense, experts believe that the Russian side is better equipped and can rely on its highly sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities, where the Ukrainian military still lags far behind.
Both sides have recognized and internalized the importance of drones on various levels. Currently, the focus of both sides is on First Person View (FPV) drones. Despite the already highly effective use of loitering ammunition (Lancet Drones) on the Russian side, there appears to be a strong determination not to fall behind in the development of combat-capable FPV drones. These FPV-Drones are very small drones with shorter range and flight duration, essentially carrying an artillery or rocket warhead and flying directly into the target. They are basically intelligent munitions. According to Russian reports, the use of these drones has tripled in the last two months, with thousands produced per month. While these numbers should be taken with caution, the trend towards massive use of FPV-Drones is clear. Furthermore, both sides have announced their ability to control FPV drones using AI. The deployment of small drone swarms controlled by AI, flying toward their targets is no longer a science fiction scenario but could become a reality, ushering in a possible new phase of warfare in the ongoing conflict.
