Anyone looking at what happened on October 7th, 2023, in the Gaza Strip, is shocked by what happened on October 7, 2023, in the Gaza Strip, with an „incursion“ towards the occupied territories of 1948, attacking settlements, and the „Ethkan“ operation carried out by the Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the Palestinian Hamas movement, resulting in hundreds of Israeli casualties and injuries, as well as the taking of dozens of Israeli prisoners or detainees.
In times of war and confrontation, the wings of one party do not exchange blame, and they pretend unity. This applies to the Israeli opposition, led by Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz. However, as the initial confrontation hours pass, blame begins to be exchanged, and truths are revealed. In practice, what happened can be understood through a sequence that highlights Israeli failures, both in terms of security and politics. It illustrates how the government of extremist Zionist religious zealots made a series of mistakes and how the „fantasies“ of this government exposed the reality to which Israel was dragged. Israeli parties had warned of the danger of this government.
The sequence of events that led to what happened in the Ashkelon region, north of Gaza, can be described in several stages.
First, the six prisoners escaped from Gilboa prison in September 2021. At that time, the surprise was how the prisoners managed to defeat the technology, cameras, and plans of the prison, described as the most complex. It turned out that the prisoners were able to access or dismantle the construction plans and draw up an escape plan that struck at the notion of an invincible army and Israeli technology.
The second stage was built upon the escape of the prisoners. The formation of the Jenin Battalion began to support the prisoners during their escape, but their recapture led the battalion to transform into a form of resistance. This phenomenon expanded to form brigades and groups that later began to occupy the Israeli army and draw the attention of Israeli security, at the expense of the Gaza Strip.
Israel bet that the top priority in Gaza is the continuation of Hamas authority, even in a state of weakness.
The third stage involves Israeli governments adopting a plan based on dividing the West Bank and Gaza Strip and assisting both authorities to remain in their respective places: Hamas authority in Gaza and Fatah authority in the West Bank, with the condition that both authorities remain weak. Israel allowed foreign funds to enter Gaza, eased the blockade, allowed thousands of workers from the Gaza Strip to work on Israeli projects, and encouraged and coordinated with Hamas through intermediaries for companies in the Strip to work for the benefit of Israeli factories. Israel believed that these „arrangements“ were sufficient to convince Hamas to maintain calm. However, Israel failed to realize that the suffering of civilians in Gaza did not affect the armed wing. In late May 2021, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, threatened to „burn everything to the ground“ if the Gaza issue was not resolved. At that time, it was revealed that the financial resources, expertise, and intelligence of the Al-Qassam Brigades were separate from the rest of Hamas in Gaza and relied on entities including Iran and Hezbollah. However, Israel bet that the top priority in Gaza is the continuation of Hamas authority, even in a state of weakness, and did not take the threat of „burning everything to the ground“ seriously. It also did not consider the consequences of resources available to the Al-Qassam Brigades and armed wings separate from the „Gaza economy.“ This contributed to a relaxation within the Israeli army and a focus on armed groups in the West Bank. Israel targeted leaders of the Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Gaza who were believed to be involved in stirring up the West Bank. An example of this is the assassinations committed by Israel last May and its ongoing threat to target the Hamas leader residing abroad, Salah al-Arouri, considering him responsible for armed activities in the West Bank.
The Israeli elections in November 2022 resulted in a government that significantly restructured security and defense in Israel in a highly unusual manner.
The fourth stop on the way to October 7th was the Israeli elections in November 2022, which resulted in a government that restructured Israel’s security and defense in a highly unusual manner. For example, the Israeli Ministry of Defense now has two ministers, one from the Likud party, Yoav Gallant, and the other with specific authorities within the ministry, Betzalel Smotrich, who comes from the religious Zionist stream and lacks security experience. Eitam Ben Gvir was appointed as the Minister of National Security with the authority to establish new forces separate from the army. However, Ben Gvir has no security or military experience and was previously rejected from serving in the army due to his behavior and positions, holding a grudge against the military leadership.
Israeli opposition officials, including former Defense Minister Benny Gantz, warned of the danger of these developments. Gantz tweeted on November 26, 2022, on his Twitter account, stating that „National Security – or dismantling security into parts of power and establishing a separate army for Ben Gvir?“ He said that what was happening was the dismantling of government authorities into „fragments of ministries“ and that it would lead to a security risk. Former Chief of Staff, Gadi Eisenkot, described appointing Ben Gvir to the National Security portfolio as a „sad joke.“ Indeed, disputes have arisen within the Israeli army and among the ministers responsible for security, leading to conflicting leadership within Israeli security.
Training exercises for the Al-Qassam Brigades included raids on settlements, but everyone considered them as mere demonstrations.
The fifth milestone was related to the legal amendments that the Netanyahu government wanted to implement, which aimed to reduce the judiciary’s powers in monitoring the government and holding politicians accountable. It also aimed to increase the authority of the ministers in determining settlement development and governance in the West Bank and settlements. This led to unprecedented protests in Israel, including the participation of army officers in the protests and many of them refraining from service. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant was even dismissed from his position in March, due to his stance on the protests, before being reinstated about two weeks later, amidst confusion within Israeli security agencies.
The sixth milestone took place on June 3rd of last year, which could be considered a small-scale rehearsal for October 7th. On that day, an Egyptian police officer entered Palestinian territory, killed three Israeli soldiers, and spent hours without the Israeli army realizing the death of its soldiers or the presence of the attacker. This was a glaring indication of laxity within the Israeli army.
In this context, Israelis believed, before October 7th, that they had deterred Gaza and their government had reduced the possibilities of a Palestinian reaction to the incursions at Al-Aqsa and settlement activities. At the same time, the Israeli security leadership was going through a crisis. Many soldiers were deployed in the West Bank at the expense of the southern region. While the military wing of Hamas worked quietly, conducting exercises that everyone considered closer to imagination, as the Al-Qassam Brigades‘ training included raids on settlements, but everyone regarded them as mere demonstrations. Meanwhile, the morale of the Israeli army was declining due to political divisions and the depletion of its forces in protecting settler „gangs“ and their violence in the West Bank, in addition to the lack of consensus among security leadership.
