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The Future of Germany: Between the Loss of Credibility of the Governing Parties and the Growing Acceptance of the AfD

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IIC Berlin

Rising Acceptance of the AfD in Germany

Rising Acceptance of the AfD in Germany has become one of the most significant political phenomena in recent German history. This development reflects the growing loss of credibility of governing parties and raises fundamental questions about voter behaviour, political miscalculations, and the future direction of Germany’s political landscape.

What characterises the Alternative for Germany (AfD)? What does its political future look like? Why do German voters give their support to a party that was only founded in 2013? What are the party’s strengths and weaknesses? Have its traditional positions on immigration and conservative social policies contributed to its rapid acceptance among German voters? And how can the support — and even electoral success — of the AfD among broad segments of society, including citizens with a migration background, be explained?


From Marginal Party to Political Force

Following the establishment of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in 2013, many observers assumed it would become just another of the many small right-wing parties in Germany — founded, active for a few years, and eventually fading into political irrelevance, even if remaining formally registered. German institutions were not expected to take the party seriously, and its influence on voters was believed to be limited, comparable to that of minor right-wing parties elsewhere in Europe.

At best, some analysts predicted the AfD might resemble a German version of the French Rassemblement National, whose leadership, despite public attention, would exercise only limited political influence. These expectations, however, proved to be fundamentally flawed.


Breaking Historical Patterns

For the first time in post-war German history, a right-wing party succeeded in gaining a durable foothold within the electorate and establishing a significant parliamentary presence. The rising acceptance of the AfD in Germany unsettled the established political parties and forced them to reassess long-held assumptions about voter loyalty and political stability.

Rather than becoming a short-lived phenomenon like many right-wing parties of the 1950s, 1960s, or early 1980s, the AfD surpassed the influence of parties that never achieved meaningful electoral success, despite formally existing to this day. Most notably, within a relatively short period, the AfD exceeded the historical influence of the NPD, whose strongest electoral result of 4.3 percent in 1969 was surpassed by the AfD in 2013.

This development raises a central question: why did political experts and established parties miscalculate so profoundly?


Structural Weaknesses of the Established Parties

Unlike many right-wing movements in Germany and Europe, the AfD did not emerge in isolation. Instead, it benefited directly from structural weaknesses within the traditional party system. These weaknesses resulted from the gradual erosion of credibility of Germany’s long-governing parties — particularly the CDU and SPD — which had alternated in power since the post-war period.

Declining public confidence in both domestic and foreign policy decisions created political space that the AfD was able to occupy. The party’s rise was further strengthened by the support and defection of prominent figures from the CDU, including Bernd Lucke, a Hamburg-based economics professor, and Alexander Gauland, both of whom had previously been members of the Christian Democratic Union.

Die Zukunft der AfD: Ursachen ihres Aufstiegs und die Krise der etablierten Parteien in Deutschland


Early Ideology and Electoral Breakthrough

In its initial phase, the AfD pursued a relatively moderate ideological course, combining free-market liberalism with social conservatism, while placing strong emphasis on criticism of the Eurozone. This positioning enabled the party to attract voters dissatisfied with the domestic and European policies of the established parties.

Although the AfD narrowly failed to pass the five-percent threshold in the 2013 federal election, it significantly expanded its support base during the same year’s federal and regional elections. This momentum continued in the European elections and in several eastern German state elections in 2014, marking the party’s transition from a protest movement to a structured political force.


The Refugee Crisis and Political Consolidation

By sharpening its political identity and clearly distinguishing itself from the established parties, the AfD further increased its appeal — particularly after adopting a clear and uncompromising stance during the refugee crisis of September 2015. This positioning resonated with voters who felt increasingly disconnected from mainstream political discourse.

The impact of this strategy became evident in subsequent elections. In the 2016 state elections and the 2017 federal election, the AfD nearly tripled its share of the vote compared to 2013, becoming the third strongest party in the Bundestag. Since then, the rising acceptance of the AfD in Germany has remained a central topic of political debate.


A Distinct Voter Base

Election results indicate that the AfD’s voter base differs structurally from that of the established parties. Analysts note particularly strong support among parts of the middle class and among voters concerned about social decline and loss of status. Some experts even predict that this base may continue to expand.

Paradoxically, efforts by established parties and sections of the media to discredit the AfD may have contributed to its growing appeal, reinforcing perceptions among supporters that their concerns are being ignored or dismissed by political elites.


Limits of Populism and Internal Weaknesses

Alice Weidel
Wahlabend Sachsen 2019

Despite its electoral success, the AfD continues to face significant internal challenges. Many experts argue that the party has struggled to move beyond traditional patterns of right-wing populism, focusing more on criticising political elites than on systematically developing its own policy strengths.

Generalised slogans about threats to national identity and social cohesion — particularly in the context of immigration — may mobilise voters in the short term, but they are insufficient for long-term governance. This limitation is especially evident in western Germany, where the party has struggled to replicate its eastern electoral success.


Why a Comprehensive Political Programme Is Essential

To genuinely represent public interests and convince a broader electorate, the AfD requires a comprehensive political programme. Such a programme cannot focus solely on domestic policy areas such as family, education, health, migration, asylum, or European affairs.

Instead, the party must articulate clear, realistic, and coherent foreign policy objectives. This is essential if the AfD intends to govern Germany in the future — whether independently or as part of a coalition. At present, this remains one of the party’s most significant shortcomings.

A pro-Russian stance in the Ukraine conflict alone is insufficient; the underlying strategic mechanisms and long-term objectives must be clearly explained. Without a credible foreign and security policy framework, the AfD’s claim to national leadership remains incomplete.


Conclusion: Between Populism and Governance

Ultimately, the future of Germany’s political landscape will depend on whether voters perceive the rising acceptance of the AfD in Germany as a pathway toward rational political discourse or merely another expression of electoral populism within an increasingly polarised system.

German voters have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to distinguish between symbolic protest and substantive political alternatives. Whether the AfD can transform its electoral momentum into sustainable governance will determine not only its own future, but also the future of Germany’s established parties and democratic institutions.

IIC Berlin